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The aim of this study was to explore a behavior-analytic model of analogical reasoning, defined as
the discrimination of formal similarity via equivalence–equivalence responding. In Experiment 1,
adult humans were trained and tested for the formation of four three-member equivalence relations:
A1-B1-C1, A2-B2-C2, A3-B3-C3, and A4-B4-C4. The B and C stimuli were three-letter nonsense sylla-
bles, and the A stimulus was a colored shape. Subjects were then successfully tested for equivalence–
equivalence responding (e.g., matching B1/C1 to B2/C2 rather than B3/C4). These tasks were
designed such that equivalence–equivalence responding might allow subjects to discriminate a phys-
ical similarity between the relations involved. Some participants (color subjects) received only equiv-
alence–equivalence tasks in which they might discriminate a color relation, whereas others (shape
subjects) were given tasks in which they might discriminate a shape relation. A control group received
both types of task. In a subsequent test for the discrimination of formal similarity, color subjects
matched according to color, shape subjects matched according to shape, and the control group
showed no consistent matching pattern. In Experiment 2, adult humans showed a transformation
of the functions of a block-sorting task via this basic model of analogy. Empirical and conceptual
issues related to these results are discussed.
Key words: analogy, relational frame theory, equivalence–equivalence, relations between relations,
model, humans
When human subjects are trained in a se-
ries of overlapping conditional discrimina-
tions using a matching-to-sample format, they
will often demonstrate a number of un-
trained or derived responses in subsequent
relevant tests. For example, if a subject is
trained to choose a stimulus, B, given a sec-
ond stimulus, A, and is also trained to choose
a third stimulus, C, given A, he or she may,
without further training, choose A given B
and A given C (i.e., symmetrical responding)
and choose C given B and B given C (i.e.,
combined symmetrical and transitive re-
sponding). When a subject produces such a
response pattern, the stimuli involved are
said to participate in a derived equivalence
relation.
An array of empirical evidence now exists
to link the phenomenon of derived equiva-
lence responding to human language. For
example, equivalence responding has been
observed in a wide variety of verbally able
human adults, but it has not yet been dem-
onstrated unequivocally in verbally deficient
humans or in nonhumans (see Barnes,
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McCullagh, & Keenan, 1990; Devany, Hayes,
& Nelson, 1986; Dugdale & Lowe, 1990;
Hayes, 1989; Sidman et al., 1982). Even in
those cases in which equivalence has been
demonstrated in subjects with severe learn-
ing disabilities, basic receptive language
skills were present (Carr, Wilkinson, Black-
man, & McIlvane, 2000). In addition, a
wealth of empirical research on equivalence
and other derived relations has shown their
generativity (e.g., Dube, McIlvane, Maguire,
Mackay, & Stoddard, 1989; Saunders, Wach-
ter, & Spradlin, 1988; Sidman & Tailby,
1982), their sensitivity to contextual control
(e.g., Bush, Sidman, & de Rose, 1989;
Roche, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Barnes-
Holmes, & McGeady, 2000; Wulfert, Green-
way, & Dougher, 1994), and the ease with
which a transfer of functions across such re-
lations may be demonstrated (Barnes &
Keenan, 1993; Dougher & Markham, 1994;
Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 1991). These
findings provide additional evidence for the
parallel between equivalence relations and
language, and indicate that equivalence and
derived relations more generally can provide
a useful model of language and other ex-
amples of complex human functioning (e.g.,
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Fields, Verhave, & Fath, 1984; Sidman, 1986;
Wulfert et al., 1994).
One behavioral account that has attempted
to explain the relationship between derived
stimulus relations and human language is re-
lational frame theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes,
& Roche, 2001). This theory adopts the po-
sition that both phenomena are examples of
the same behavioral process—arbitrarily ap-
plicable relational responding. Nonarbitrary
forms of relational responding such as iden-
tity and oddity matching, for example, are
well known in behavior analysis (e.g., Kastak
& Schusterman, 1994). In both types of
matching, the relational response is con-
trolled in part by the nonarbitrary or formal
relation between sample and comparison
stimuli. Relational frame theory argues that
relational responding may be brought under
contextual control in which the relational re-
sponses are determined not by the formal
properties of the related events but by addi-
tional contextual cues. For example, if X is
specified as the same as Y, then a verbally
competent human may state that ‘‘Y is the
same as X,’’ based on the contextual control
established by the verbal community for the
word same. In this case, the relation of same-
ness established between X and Y is applied
arbitrarily (by the verbal community) and is
not determined by the physical relation be-
tween the stimuli. Arbitrarily applicable rela-
tional responses such as this define relational
frames.
According to relational frame theory, re-
sponding in accordance with relational
frames involves the following three proper-
ties: mutual entailment, combinatorial entail-
ment, and the transformation of function
(O’Hora, Roche, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets,
2002). Mutual entailment occurs when, in a
given context, if Stimulus A bears a relation
to Stimulus B, then a further derived relation
between B and A is mutually entailed. The
type of relation depends on the type of
trained relation between A and B (Hayes,
1994). For instance, if Stimulus A bears a same
as relation to B, then the relation ‘‘B is the
same as A’’ is entailed. Trained and mutually
entailed relations are not, however, always
identical. For instance, given ‘‘A is more than
B,’’ a less than relation is mutually entailed
between B and A (i.e., B is less than A). Com-
binatorial entailment is more complex. For
example, if Stimulus A bears a relation to B
and B bears a relation to C, then a relation
between A and C can be derived. The nature
of this derived relation depends on the na-
ture of the trained relations. For example, if
A is more than B and B is more than C, then a
more than relation between A and C is derived
by combinatorial entailment (i.e., A is more
than C) and a less than relation is entailed
between C and A (i.e., C is less than A).
Transformation of function occurs when
Stimulus A is related to Stimulus B, and A
acquires a psychological function by virtue of
this relation. In certain contexts, therefore,
the stimulus functions of B will be trans-
formed in accord with the A-B relation. For
example, if A is more than B, and A actualizes
fear, then B will actualize less fear than A.
Numerous studies have now provided em-
pirical evidence to support the concept of
multiple relational frames (Dymond &
Barnes, 1994, 1995, 1996; Hayes, 1991; Roche
& Barnes, 1996; Roche, Barnes, & Smeets,
1997; Roche et al., 2000). Relational frame
theory also makes specific predictions about
higher levels of relational complexity in
which relational frames are related to rela-
tional frames, thereby giving rise to what are
referred to as relational networks (Stewart,
Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Lipkens, 2001;
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets,
2001). Relational frame theory thus makes
the specific prediction that derived relations
may be related to other derived relations (an
empirical example of such complex relational
responding will be described below). More
important in the context of the current re-
search, relational frame theory argues that re-
sponding in accordance with relations be-
tween relations (hereafter referred to as
relating relations) provides the theoretical
basis for a functional analysis of the key be-
havioral properties of analogical reasoning
(Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets, 1997; Stewart,
Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001).
Barnes et al. (1997) provided a behavioral
analogue of analogical reasoning based on
what they referred to as equivalence–equiva-
lence responding (see also Lipkens, 1992). In
their words:
Consider . . . the following question based on
the classic proportion scheme (A : B :: C : ?);
‘‘apple is to orange as dog is to (i) sheep or
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(ii) book?’’ If ‘‘apple’’ and ‘‘orange’’ partici-
pate in an equivalence relation in the context
‘‘fruit,’’ and ‘‘dog’’ and ‘‘sheep’’ participate in
an equivalence relation in the context ‘‘ani-
mals,’’ then we would expect a person to pick
‘‘sheep’’ as the correct answer. In effect, the
response would be in accordance with the de-
rived equivalence relation between two al-
ready established separate equivalence rela-
tions. . . . We take the view that equivalence–
equivalence responding is an example of a
relational network as defined by relational
frame theory (e.g., Barnes & Holmes, 1991;
Barnes, 1994; Hayes, 1991, 1994). (p. 3)
The first experiment reported by Barnes et
al. (1997) examined the relations between
two separate equivalence relations and be-
tween two separate nonequivalence relations.
Subjects were first trained and tested for the
formation of four three-member equivalence
relations (train AB and AC, and test BC and
CB). After passing the equivalence test, sub-
jects were tested to determine whether they
would relate pairs of stimuli to other pairs of
stimuli based on their participation in equiv-
alence relations. In effect, subjects were pre-
sented with samples that contained two stim-
uli from one derived equivalence relation
(e.g., B1/C1), and were given the opportu-
nity to choose comparisons that contained
two stimuli from a second, separate derived
equivalence relation (e.g., B3/C3). All sub-
jects successfully related equivalence relations
to other separate equivalence relations and
related nonequivalence relations (e.g., B1/
B2) to other separate nonequivalence rela-
tions (e.g., B3/C4), in the absence of explicit
reinforcement (this basic effect has recently
been replicated with adults and 9- and 5-year-
old children by Carpentier, Smeets, & Barnes-
Holmes, in press). Experiment 2 employed
the same procedures as Experiment 1, except
that subjects were exposed to the equiva-
lence–equivalence test before being exposed
immediately, and without further training, to
the standard equivalence test. Again, all sub-
jects successfully related equivalence relations
to other separate equivalence relations and
related nonequivalence relations to other
separate nonequivalence relations.
Although Barnes et al. (1997) provided
one of the first empirical behavioral demon-
strations of analogical reasoning, their theo-
retical model lacked one critical element in-
volved in analogy as typically observed in the
natural environment: formal or nonarbitrary
relations. For illustrative purposes, consider
the proportion scheme as outlined above: A
: B :: C : D (i.e., A is to B as C is to D). In
this highly abstract case, the actual Stimuli A,
B, C, and D are completely arbitrary. How-
ever, in most cases of analogy, the arbitrary
relations appear to be determined to some
degree by the nonarbitrary relations that oc-
cur among some of the stimuli that partici-
pate in the network. Consider the example
provided by Barnes et al.: Apple is to orange
as dog is to sheep. In this example, the arbi-
trary equivalence relation between the words
apple and orange is based, to some degree, on
the nonarbitrary or physical relation of simi-
larity between actual apples and actual orang-
es (i.e., both are small, spherical, edible,
sweet, etc.). Similarly, the arbitrary equiva-
lence relation between the words dog and
sheep is based on the nonarbitrary relation of
similarity between actual dogs and actual
sheep (i.e., in general, they are four legged,
mobile, hairy, etc.). Thus, the equivalence–
equivalence or analogical relation between
the equivalence relations apple–orange and
dog–sheep may be traced back to the formal
relations that are obtained between particular
objects in the environment.
In a subsequent study, the Barnes et al.
(1997) model and experimental preparation
were extended by demonstrating equiva-
lence–equivalence responding based on the
abstraction of common formal properties
(Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets,
2001). College students were taught, using a
delayed matching-to-sample procedure, to
choose a particular nonsense syllable in the
presence of each of four blue and four red
geometric shapes. In a subsequent test, all 9
subjects demonstrated equivalence formation
based on the abstraction of color by consis-
tently matching nonsense syllables related to
same-colored shapes to each other. Most sub-
jects then showed equivalence–equivalence
responding in which equivalence relations
from the previous part of the experiment
were related to other equivalence relations
and nonequivalence relations were related to
other nonequivalence relations.
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, and
Smeets (2001) thus provided an analysis of
analogy incorporating nonarbitrary proper-
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ties, which arguably are an essential aspect of
this phenomenon. This theoretical model
might also be extended to capture one of the
core properties of analogical language more
generally. For illustrative purposes, consider
the analogy, ‘‘an atom is like the solar sys-
tem.’’ In this example, the relation of the
electrons to the nucleus is brought into an
equivalence relation with the relation of the
planets to the sun. In this case, a listener may
relate a nucleus and its electrons in the same
way that the listener relates the sun and the
planets (i.e., hub to satellite). From this per-
spective, analogies are often used to help a
listener discriminate a formal or nonarbitrary
relation between two events (Stewart, Barnes-
Holmes, Hayes, & Lipkens, 2001). In the ex-
perimental protocol used by Stewart et al.
(2001), however, subjects were first required
to discriminate the formal color or age rela-
tions to form the separate equivalence rela-
tions. Thus, when subjects subsequently
formed the complete equivalence–equiva-
lence relational network, it did not give rise
to the discrimination of a new formal rela-
tion. The present study developed a model
and experimental analogue to assess the
emergence of this type of discrimination,
which apparently characterizes analogical lan-
guage. The protocol involved training and
testing four three-member equivalence clas-
ses, testing for equivalence–equivalence re-
sponding using tests designed to establish
particular patterns of nonarbitrary relational
responding along the dimensions of shape
and color, and then testing for discrimination
of nonarbitrary similarity.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Subjects
Seven subjects (5 women and 2 men),
ranging in age from 18 to 21 years, partici-
pated in this experiment. All 7 subjects were
1st-year psychology undergraduates. All sub-
jects were recruited through personal con-
tacts, and none had any prior experience in
the areas of stimulus equivalence or relation-
al frame theory. When the experiment was
finished each subject was thanked and de-
briefed.
Apparatus and Materials
Each subject was seated at a table in a small
experimental room containing an Apple Mac-
intoshy microcomputer (Performa 630) that
displayed both colored stimuli and black
characters on a white background. Stimulus
presentation and the recording of responses
were controlled by the computer, which was
programmed using PsyScope, a graphical sys-
tem for the design of psychology experiments
(see Roche, Stewart, & Barnes-Holmes,
1999).
Computer-generated stimuli. The experimen-
tal stimuli included four colored shapes: a
red square (A1), a red circle (A2), a blue
square (A3), and a blue circle (A4). Each col-
ored shape measured approximately 22.5
cm2. Eight nonsense syllables were also used:
zid (B1), cug (B2), kel (B3), jom (B4), dax
(C1), rog (C2), tob (C3), and paf (C4).
These nonsense syllables and the four col-
ored shapes will be referred to using their
respective alphanumeric labels. Subjects nev-
er saw these labels.
Matching to sample. The experiment in-
volved conditional discrimination matching-
to-sample (MTS) training, during which the
colored shapes served as sample stimuli and
the nonsense syllables served as comparisons.
For MTS trials, the sample stimulus appeared
in the center of the screen. Following a 1.5-s
delay, four comparison stimuli appeared, one
in each of the four corners of the screen. On
each MTS trial the position of the compari-
son stimuli was varied randomly (i.e., the re-
inforced comparison could appear in any one
of the four corners of the screen with equal
probability).
Subjects chose a comparison by moving the
cursor over the comparison with the mouse
and then clicking the mouse button. The cor-
rect completion of an MTS training trial re-
moved the stimulus display and produced the
word ‘‘correct’’ in the center of the screen,
accompanied simultaneously by the comput-
er-generated spoken word ‘‘correct.’’ The in-
correct completion of an MTS training trial
removed the stimulus display and produced
the word ‘‘wrong’’ in the center of the screen
accompanied simultaneously by the comput-
er-generated spoken word ‘‘wrong.’’ A 1-s in-
tertrial interval, in which the screen cleared
and remained blank, followed all pro-
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grammed consequences. On all test trials the
computer omitted all feedback messages and
proceeded directly to the intertrial interval.
Procedure
All 7 subjects were trained and tested in-
dividually during sessions that lasted between
45 and 110 min each, depending on subject
availability and preference. A subject who did
not complete the experiment in one session
was asked to return (usually the following
day). The maximum number of sessions re-
quired to complete the experiment was two.
To ensure that the previously established per-
formances were still intact, at the beginning
of the next session the subject was reexposed
to those stages of the experiment that he or
she had previously completed. On some oc-
casions, therefore, a subject could successfully
complete a particular stage in the experi-
ment, but would be reexposed to that stage
for a second time.
Training. Each subject was seated in front
of the computer monitor and keyboard and
wore a set of headphones through which he
or she could receive aural feedback from the
computer. The experimenter left the room
and the subject then read the following in-
structions on the computer screen:
In a moment some objects will appear on this
screen. Your task is to first look at the object
in the center of the screen and then at the
objects in each of the four corners of the
screen. You then have to choose one of the
four ‘‘corner situated’’ objects and you can do
this by placing the mouse cursor on top of it
and then clicking the mouse button. So, if you
want to choose the object in the upper left
corner, click on the object in the upper left
corner; if you want to choose the object in the
upper right corner, click on the object in the
upper right corner; if you want to choose the
object in the lower left corner, click on the
object in the lower left corner; and if you want
to choose the object in the lower right corner,
click on the object in the lower right corner.
Click the mouse when you are ready to begin.
On each MTS trial one of four colored
shapes (A1, A2, A3, or A4) was presented as
a sample, followed 1.5-s later by four compar-
ison stimuli. This training phase involved two
conditional discriminations, each of which in-
volved four trial types (see Figure 1, top). In
both of these conditional discriminations,
each of the four colored shapes served as the
sample in one of the four tasks. In one of the
conditional discriminations (A-B), the non-
sense syllables B1, B2, B3, and B4 served as
comparisons in all four trial types.
Trial types were presented in blocks of 56
trials. For the first 20 trials in a block, each
of the four MTS trial types from the A-B con-
ditional discrimination was presented in a
quasirandom order (i.e., each trial type was
presented five times). For the second 20 tri-
als, each of the four MTS trial types from the
A-C conditional discrimination was presented
in a quasirandom order (again, each trial
type was presented five times). For the final
16 trials in a block, each of the eight trial
types (i.e., both A-B and A-C) was presented
twice. These blocks of 56 trial types were pre-
sented to the subject until he or she pro-
duced at least six of seven correct responses
on each of the eight trial types involved. At
this point, the equivalence test occurred.
Equivalence test. Having received training in
A-B and A-C relations, the subjects were now
tested for B-C and C-B equivalence relations.
Before this equivalence test, subjects were
provided with instructions, on the computer
screen, that were identical to those presented
at the beginning of the conditional discrimi-
nation training.
Testing consisted of eight MTS trial types
designed to test all of the experimenter-des-
ignated emergent relations. In four of the tri-
al types, which tested for B-C relations, each
of the four B stimuli served individually as the
sample in the center of the screen, and all
four of the C stimuli served as comparisons,
one in each of the four corners of the screen.
In the remaining four trial types, which tested
for C-B relations, the format was similar ex-
cept that the C stimuli served as samples and
the B stimuli served as comparisons. Test tri-
als were presented in blocks of 40. For the
first 20 trials, each of the four B-C relations
was tested five times in a quasirandom order,
and for the remaining 20 trials, each of the
four C-B relations was tested five times in a
quasirandom order (see Figure 1). No feed-
back occurred on any trial.
Subjects were exposed to the equivalence
test until they chose the same comparison at
least four times out of every five exposures to
a particular trial type, irrespective of whether
their response patterns were consistent with
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Fig. 1. Top: MTS equivalence training and testing. In the upper box are the eight trial types presented to subjects
during MTS equivalence training. The four trial types on the left were for training A-B relations, and the four on the right
were for training A-C relations. The eight trial types presented to subjects during MTS equivalence testing are in the lower
box. The four trial types on the left were for testing B-C relations, and the four trial types on the right were for testing C-
B relations. The experimenter-designated correct choice in each task is indicated by the arrow. Bottom: the equivalence
relations that were trained and tested during Experiment 2. In the upper box is a schematic diagram showing the equiv-
alence relations that were trained and tested during Experiment 2. In the lower box is an example of one of the DE-DE
tasks presented to subjects during the equivalence–equivalence tests of Experiment 2.
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the predicted relations. If a subject chose the
correct comparison five times out of five
across seven of the trial types but emitted only
three correct responses on the eighth, he or
she failed to meet the four-same-responses-
out-of-five test criterion despite achieving
95% correct. Inconsistency after four expo-
sures to testing defined terminal perfor-
mance.
Equivalence–equivalence test. During this sec-
ond test, subjects were presented with one
pair of nonsense syllables as the sample stim-
ulus and two other pairs of nonsense syllables
as the comparison stimuli (see Figure 2). The
syllable pair that served as the sample always
included two nonsense syllables that partici-
pated in an experimenter-designated equiva-
lence class (e.g., B1/C1). Of the two syllable
pairs that served as comparison stimuli, one
always included two experimenter-designated
equivalent nonsense syllables (e.g., B2/C2),
and the other always included two experi-
menter-designated nonequivalent nonsense
syllables (e.g., B3/C4). It was predicted that
subjects would show equivalence–equivalence
responding by consistently matching the
equivalent-pair comparisons to the equiva-
lent-pair samples.
Before exposure to equivalence–equiva-
lence tests, each subject was assigned to one
of three groups: color, shape, or control. For
color subjects, the equivalence–equivalence
test consisted of four matching-to-sample trial
types (see Figure 3, bottom), which may be
represented as the following stimulus triads
(the sample in each triad is first and the ex-
perimenter-designated correct comparison is
in italics): B1/C1, B2/C2, B3/C4; B3/C3, B4/
C4, B1/C2; B2/C2, B1/C1, B4/C3; B4/C4,
B3/C3, B2/C1. These trial types were pre-
sented in a quasirandom order, with each oc-
curring five times within a block of 20 trials.
Given any one of these four particular equiv-
alence–equivalence trial types, a subject who
responded correctly could also discriminate a
formal similarity in terms of color between
the correctly chosen comparison and the
sample stimulus. For example, matching B2/
C2 to B1/C1 involved matching one equiva-
lent pair to another pair, and each of these
pairs contained elements that were related to
other stimuli (i.e., A1 and A2) that were iden-
tical in color but not in shape (in this case,
A1 was a red square and A2 was a red circle).
For shape subjects, the equivalence–equiv-
alence test also consisted of four matching-to-
sample trial types (see Figure 3, bottom),
which may be represented as the following
stimulus triads: B1/C1, B3/C3, B2/C4; B2/
C2, B4/C4, B1/C3; B3/C3, B1/C1, B4/C2;
B4/C4, B2/C2, B3/C1. These trial types were
presented in a quasirandom order, with each
occurring five times within a block of 20 tri-
als. Given any one of these particular equiv-
alence–equivalence trial types, a subject who
responded correctly could also discriminate a
formal similarity in terms of shape between
the correctly chosen comparison and the
sample stimulus. For example, matching B3/
C3 to B1/C1 involved matching one equiva-
lent pair to another pair, and each of these
pairs contained elements that were related to
other stimuli (i.e., A1 and A3) that were iden-
tical in shape but not in color (in this case,
A1 was a red square and A3 was a blue
square).
Finally, for control subjects, the equiva-
lence–equivalence test consisted of all eight
of the MTS trial types presented to the other
two groups (i.e., all eight of the trial types
displayed in Figure 3, bottom). These eight
trial types were presented in a quasirandom
order, with each occurring five times within a
block of 40 trials. Subjects in this group who
displayed consistently correct responding
could thus discriminate formal similarities in
terms of both shape and color, depending on
the trial type presented.
Criterion. As in the equivalence tests, sub-
jects in the equivalence–equivalence tests
were required to reach a stability criterion of
80% consistent responding. This meant that
subjects were exposed to their assigned re-
gime of equivalence–equivalence testing until
they chose the same comparison at least four
times in every five exposures to a particular
trial type, irrespective of whether their re-
sponse patterns were consistent with the pre-
dicted relations. Inconsistency after four ex-
posures to testing defined a subject’s terminal
performance.
Test for discrimination of formal similarity. Sub-
jects who successfully completed the equiva-
lence–equivalence test were then exposed to
the test for formal similarity. The purpose of
this test was to determine whether subjects
who demonstrated equivalence–equivalence
responding in the previous phase would now
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Fig. 2. Top: a schematic representation of the important relations, both arbitrary and nonarbitrary, involved in Stages
2 and 3 of the relational frame theory model of analogy (see text for details). Bottom: tasks received by subjects during
the test for analogical responding. Subjects in the color group, who had been given equivalence–equivalence tests that
facilitated the discrimination of similarity along the formal dimension of color, responded to these tasks by choosing on
the basis of color. Subjects in the shape group, who had been given equivalence–equivalence tests that facilitated the
discrimination of similarity along the formal dimension of shape, responded to these tasks by choosing on the basis of
shape. The experimenter-designated correct choice in each task is indicated by the arrow.
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Fig. 3. Top: a schematic representation of Stage 1 of the RFT model of analogy, in which certain elements of the
subject’s relational network remain as yet unrelated. The diagram shows the four separate relational networks present
in the subject’s behavioral repertoire after initial (equivalence) training and testing. Note that eight of the 12 stimuli
appearing in the initial phase of the experiment (i.e., B1, B2, B3, B4, C1, C2, C3, and C4) were nonsense syllables,
whereas the remaining four stimuli (i.e., A1, A2, A3, and A4) were colored shapes. Bottom: tasks presented to subjects
during the equivalence–equivalence testing phase of the experimental analogue of analogy (Experiment 1). For the
2 color group subjects, the tasks presented included only the four tasks in the uppermost set; for the 3 shape group
subjects, the tasks presented included only the four tasks in the lowermost set; and for the 2 subjects in the control
group, the tasks were a quasirandom mix of both color group and shape group tasks. The experimenter-designated
correct choice in each task is indicated by the arrow.
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Table 1
Numbers of trials required by each subject to complete conditional discrimination training,
numbers of correct responses on equivalence and equivalence–equivalence tests, and numbers
of responses produced by each subject in accord with color and shape, respectively.
Subject Train
Test
Equiv
Equiv–equiv
(color)
Equiv–equiv
(shape)
Equiv–equiv
(control)
Discrimination
of formal
similarity
Color
1 168
56
34/40
40/40 20/20 20/20 color
2 224 38/40 19/20 20/20 color
Shape
3
4
5
112
56
168
112
40/40
40/40
40/40
40/40
20/20
20/20
20/20
20/20
11/20 shape
20/20 shape
20/20 shape
20/20 shape
Control
6 168
56
56
23/40
40/40
40/40
40/40
40/40
15/20 color
5/20 shape
7/20 color
13/20 shape
7 168
56
56
23/40
40/40
40/40
40/40
36/40
16/20 color
4/20 shape
11/20 color
9/20 shape
successfully discriminate the predicted formal
or nonarbitrary relations (i.e., either color or
shape, depending on the particular equiva-
lence–equivalence testing tasks that they had
received). In this phase, subjects were pre-
sented with one colored shape as the sample
stimulus and two other colored shapes as the
comparisons. In each of the four different tri-
al types, the sample stimulus was the same
shape as, but a different color from, one of
the two comparison stimuli, and the same col-
or as, but a different shape from, the other
comparison stimulus (see Figure 2, bottom).
For example, in one trial type, the sample
stimulus was a red square, and the two com-
parisons were a red circle and a blue square.
The four trial types were presented five times
each, in a quasirandom order, across a block
of 20 trials. It was predicted that color sub-
jects would show matching on the basis of col-
or (in this example, they would be expected
to choose the red circle in the presence of
the red square), and that shape subjects
would show matching on the basis of shape
(in this example, they would be expected to
choose the blue square in the presence of the
red square). This prediction was based on the
two different patterns of equivalence–equiv-
alence responding, which should, according
to the relational frame theory model of ana-
logical reasoning, facilitate two different types
of formal discrimination (i.e., color and
shape). Consistent patterns of responding
were not expected to occur for subjects who
had received both types of equivalence–equiv-
alence task (i.e., control subjects). Relational
frame theory predicted this on the basis that
exposure to both types of equivalence–equiv-
alence test should fail to facilitate consistent
responding in accord with either of the for-
mal dimensions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 presents (a) the number of trials
required by each subject to complete the con-
ditional discrimination training, (b) numbers
of correct responses on the equivalence tests,
(c) numbers of correct responses on the
equivalence–equivalence tests, and (d) the
number of responses produced by each sub-
ject in accord with color and shape, respec-
tively.
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For illustrative purposes, the data for Sub-
ject 1 will be described in detail. This subject
required a total of 168 training trials before
reaching the training criterion. She then
failed the equivalence test on her first expo-
sure (34 of 40 responses correct). After a fur-
ther 56 training trials, she passed the equiv-
alence test (100% correct). She was then
exposed to the equivalence–equivalence test
designed to facilitate the discrimination of a
formal similarity in terms of color, and she
responded correctly 100% of the time. Final-
ly, when exposed to the test for the discrimi-
nation of formal similarity, she showed 100%
matching on the basis of color.
Table 1 shows that all 7 subjects successfully
completed the conditional discrimination
training, equivalence testing, and equiva-
lence–equivalence testing across several ex-
posures. All of the color and shape subjects
except one produced a consistent and correct
performance on their first exposure to the
test for the discrimination for formal similar-
ity. Subject 3 (shape) showed random re-
sponding on his first exposure to this test. Af-
ter being retrained and retested, however, he
then matched with 100% accuracy on the ba-
sis of shape.
As predicted, both color subjects matched
on the basis of color during the test for the
discrimination of formal similarity (e.g.,
matching a red circle to a red square), where-
as the 3 shape subjects matched on the basis
of shape during this test (e.g., matching a red
circle to a blue circle). No consistent pattern
of responding emerged across control sub-
jects, each of whom was tested twice. In con-
clusion, the data from this experiment pro-
vide support for the relational frame theory
model of analogical reasoning in that each of
the color and shape subjects showed equiva-
lence–equivalence responding that led to a
predicted discrimination of formal similarity.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to extend Ex-
periment 1 in three ways. First, it aimed to
provide an experimental analogue of a trans-
formation of functions, or change in behav-
ior, via analogy. If a reader or listener under-
stands the analogy ‘‘an atom is like the solar
system,’’ for example, then the analogy will
probably change the functions of the word
atom for that person. For example, the person
might produce the words hub and satellite
when asked to describe the structure of an
atom. To develop procedures to examine
such outcomes, it was important that the con-
text for examining the transformation of
functions was different from the test for the
discrimination of formal similarity, but also
that a discrimination along a formal dimen-
sion consistent with this test could still be
demonstrated. To accomplish this, the trans-
formation-of-function procedure involved re-
sponding to color and shape, but in a delib-
erately different context to that employed in
the test for the discrimination of formal sim-
ilarity.
The second extension of Experiment 1 in-
volved increasing the number of stimuli that
participated in the relational networks. If
analogy is a relatively advanced form of verbal
behavior, then the relational networks on
which analogy is based may sometimes in-
volve relatively extended and complex rela-
tions.
The third extension involved modifying
the equivalence–equivalence test for 2 sub-
jects. Previous subjects had been presented
with a complex sample stimulus and two com-
plex comparison stimuli on each trial. The
complex sample stimulus and one of the
complex comparisons were each composed
of two equivalent elements, whereas the re-
maining comparison was composed of two
nonequivalent elements. Thus far, we have ar-
gued that relating the former comparison to
the sample constituted an equivalence–equiv-
alence response. Matching these two complex
stimuli, however, could be interpreted as sim-
ple equivalence responding in which all four
stimuli are related to each other via the com-
mon property of color (or shape). Imagine,
for example, that the sample is D1/E1 and
the comparisons are D2/E2 and D3/E4. It is
possible that subjects could choose D2/E2
not on the basis that the elements in both
D1/E1 and D2/E2 are equivalent, but be-
cause D1, E1, D2, and E2 all participate in an
equivalence class based on the abstraction of
the nonarbitrary property of red. To provide
evidence for equivalence–equivalence re-
sponding rather than simple equivalence re-
sponding, 2 subjects were provided with an
equivalence–equivalence test involving three
comparisons instead of the original two (see
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Figure 4, top, for a schematic representation
of one of the tasks). The third comparison
included two stimuli that did not participate
in the arbitrary equivalence relations but were
equivalent on the basis of the common prop-
erty of color (e.g., D2/E1). These subjects,
therefore, could choose two of the three com-
parisons if they were responding according to
a simple color-based equivalence relation. If,
however, they were responding according to
an equivalence–equivalence relation, only
one comparison was the correct choice (see
Figure 4, bottom, for a representation of each
of the eight trial types).
METHOD
Subjects
Four men, 2 (Subjects 8 and 9) aged 19, 1
(Subject 10) aged 32, and the 4th (Subject
11) aged 40, participated in this experiment.
Subjects 8 and 9 were nonpsychology under-
graduates, Subject 10 was a full-time engi-
neer, and Subject 11 was a laboratory tech-
nician. All were recruited through personal
contacts, and none had any prior experience
in the areas of stimulus equivalence or rela-
tional frame theory. The general conditions
of participation in Experiment 1 (e.g., train-
ing and testing individually) applied.
Apparatus and Materials
The apparatus and materials were identical
to those in Experiment 1 except for the ad-
dition of the following. A sorting task em-
ployed 16 wooden blocks that varied across
the two dimensions of color and shape: Four
blocks each were red, blue, yellow, and green,
and for each color, one block was triangular,
one was circular, one was a square, and the
fourth was a rectangle. Four novel colored
shapes (an orange diamond [A1], an orange
cross [A2], a purple diamond [A3], and a
purple cross [A4]) replaced the four colored
shapes used in the first experiment. The stim-
uli also included eight additional nonsense
syllables as follows: tez (D1), gol (E1), fot
(D2), zem (E2), bup (D3), yim (E3), sar
(D4), and lud (E4).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 was sim-
ilar to that for Experiment 1, except for the
following details.
Experimental sequence. The 4 subjects were
trained and tested individually during 80- to
180-min sessions each. The maximum num-
ber of sessions required to complete the ex-
periment was three.
Subjects were first exposed to a block-sort-
ing task in which they could sort according
to either shape or color. They were then ex-
posed to a training and testing regimen sim-
ilar to that in Experiment 1, in which the
stimuli of the first equivalence–equivalence
test depended on the pattern of block sorting
exhibited during the baseline testing. All 4
subjects sorted according to shape and thus
received the equivalence–equivalence color
test. After receiving the color-biasing equiva-
lence–equivalence test, it was predicted that
subjects would match according to color in
the subsequent (Stage 3) test. Upon comple-
tion of this training and testing regimen, the
subjects were reexposed to the block-sorting
task. It was predicted that the functions of
this task would now be transformed such that
subjects would sort the blocks on the basis of
color. Upon completion of this second phase
of block sorting, the subjects were retrained
and retested. This time, however, subjects re-
ceived the shape-biasing equivalence–equiva-
lence test. Accordingly, it was predicted that
subjects would now match according to shape
in the Stage 3 test. Subjects were then reex-
posed to the block-sorting task, and it was
predicted that they would now sort according
to shape. Subjects were then reexposed to the
whole sequence of training and testing twice
more, once more involving the original equiv-
alence–equivalence (color-biasing) test, and
once more involving the second equivalence–
equivalence (shape-biasing) test. Thus, the
experiment involved three reversals.
Block sorting. For this experimental task,
subjects were presented with the 16 wooden
blocks described previously and a box con-
taining four compartments. Before each in-
dividual block-sorting trial, subjects were read
the following instructions by the experiment-
er; ‘‘Please sort these wooden blocks into dif-
ferent piles in any way you think might be
correct, by dropping them into the compart-
ments of this box. Call me when you are fin-
ished.’’ The experimenter then left the room.
When the subject had finished, the experi-
menter returned to the room and recorded
the manner in which the blocks had been
sorted. Sorting according to color was de-
387A FUNCTIONAL-ANALYTIC MODEL OF ANALOGY
Fig. 4. Top: a schematic representation of the important relations, both arbitrary and nonarbitrary, involved in
equivalence–equivalence testing for Subjects 10 and 11 (see text for details). Bottom: tasks received by Subjects 10
and 11 during the test for analogical responding in Experiment 2. The upper panel is a representation of equiva-
lence–equivalence tests designed to facilitate the discrimination of similarity along the formal dimension of color.
The lower panel is a representation of equivalence–equivalence tests designed to facilitate the discrimination of
similarity along the formal dimension of shape. The experimenter-designated correct choice in each task is indicated
by the arrow.
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fined as placing the blocks into the four com-
partments with only one color in each com-
partment. Sorting according to shape was
defined as placing the blocks into the four
compartments with only one shape in each
compartment. Sorting was designated ‘‘oth-
er’’ if the subject sorted according to neither
of the two aforementioned patterns. The
block-sorting procedure was conducted four
times during this and all subsequent phases
of block sorting, so that by the end of this
phase, the data from four separate exposures
had been recorded.
Training and testing. The training and test-
ing regimen was similar to that in Experiment
1, except that equivalence training and test-
ing involved two stages rather than one. The
procedures for the first stage were identical
to those in Experiment 1 (i.e., A-B and A-C
training followed by B-C and C-B equivalence
testing). The second stage, which com-
menced upon successful completion of the
first, consisted of D-B and E-C training fol-
lowed by D-E and E-D equivalence testing
(Figure 1, bottom). The training was similar
to that of Stage 1 except that, across the eight
trial types, eight novel arbitrary stimuli (D1,
D2, D3, D4, E1, E2, E3, and E4) were pre-
sented as samples, with the original eight ar-
bitrary stimuli from Stage 1 presented as
comparisons (see Figure 5, top). Subjects
who successfully completed the training were
then exposed to the equivalence testing. This
test was similar to the equivalence testing of
Stage 1, except that the novel D and E stimuli
replaced the B and C stimuli employed pre-
viously (see Figure 5, top).
For Subjects 8 and 9, equivalence–equiva-
lence testing was also similar to that em-
ployed in the first experiment, except that
the novel D and E stimuli replaced the B and
C stimuli employed previously (see Figure 4,
top). For Subjects 10 and 11, however, one
additional and important procedural differ-
ence occurred in the equivalence–equiva-
lence test. During this test, one pair of non-
sense syllables was presented in the center of
the screen as the sample stimulus, and three
other pairs of nonsense syllables were pre-
sented in the lower left, lower right, and up-
per right corners of the screen as the com-
parison stimuli (see Figure 4, top). The
syllable pair that served as the sample always
included two syllables that participated in an
experimenter-designated equivalence class
(e.g., D1/E1). Of the three syllable pairs that
served as comparison stimuli, one (D2/E2)
always included two experimenter-designated
equivalent syllables that participated in the
same formal relation (e.g., color) as the ele-
ments of the sample stimulus. A second (D2/
E1) always included two nonequivalent sylla-
bles that participated in the same formal re-
lation as the elements of the sample stimulus.
The third (D3/E4) always included two non-
equivalent syllables, neither of which partici-
pated in the same formal relation as the ele-
ments in the sample stimulus. It was
predicted that subjects would show equiva-
lence–equivalence responding by consistently
matching the equivalent-pair comparison to
the equivalent-pair sample. Such a perfor-
mance would indicate that subjects were in
fact showing equivalence–equivalence re-
sponding as opposed to simple equivalence
responding based on the abstraction of the
common property of color.
For Subjects 10 and 11, as for Subjects 8
and 9, there were two separate types of equiv-
alence–equivalence test (see Figure 4, bot-
tom): one during which the subject might dis-
criminate a formal similarity based on color
and one during which the subject might dis-
criminate a formal similarity based on shape.
In all other respects, details of these tests
were identical to those completed by Subjects
8 and 9.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 are presented
in Table 2. For illustrative purposes, the data
for Subject 8 will be described in detail. In all
four initial exposures to the block test, this
subject demonstrated sorting according to
shape. He was then exposed to a total of 224
A-B/A-C training trials before demonstrating
B-C/C-B equivalence relations (39 of 40 cor-
rect). He was next exposed to 168 D-B/E-C
training trials but he failed the first test for
D-E/E-D equivalence (8 of 40 correct). Fol-
lowing reexposure to A-B/A-C training (56
trials), B-C/C-B testing (40 of 40 correct),
and D-B/E-C training (56 trials), this subject
again failed the D-E/E-D equivalence test. Af-
ter 24 hr, he was reexposed to A-B/A-C train-
ing (56 trials), B-C/C-B testing (40 of 40 cor-
rect), B-D/E-C training (56 trials), and D-E/
E-D testing, which he passed for the first time
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Fig. 5. Top: the eight trial types presented to subjects during the second phase of MTS equivalence training in
Experiment 2. The four trial types on the left were for training D-B relations, and the four on the right were for
training E-C relations. The eight trial types presented to subjects during the second phase of MTS equivalence training
in Experiment 2 are shown in the lower panel. The four trial types on the left were for testing E-D relations, and
the four trial types on the right were for testing D-E relations. The experimenter-designated correct choice in each
task is indicated by the arrow. Bottom: tasks received by Subjects 8 and 9 during the test for analogical responding
in Experiment 2. The upper panel represents equivalence–equivalence tests that facilitated the discrimination of
similarity along the formal dimension of color. The lower panel represents equivalence–equivalence tests that facili-
tated the discrimination of similarity along the formal dimension of shape.
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Table 2
Data for Subjects 8, 9, 10, and 11 in Experiment 2 including block-sorting patterns, number
of trials required to complete conditional discrimination training, numbers of correct respons-
es on equivalence and equivalence–equivalence tests, and numbers of responses produced in
accord with color and shape (F 5 fail; P 5 pass). ‘‘Shape,’’ ‘‘Color,’’ and ‘‘Other’’ indicate
that during the block-sorting test, the subject sorted the blocks based on shape, color, or
neither, respectively.
Subject Part
Block
test
(transfer
of
function)
Train
A-B
A-C
Test
Equiv
B-C
C-B
Train
D-B
E-C
Test
Equiv
D-E
E-D
Equiv–equiv
(color)
Equiv–equiv
(shape)
Discrimination
of formal
similarity
8 1 Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape 224
56
56a
56
56a
39/40 P
40/40 P
40/40 P
40/40 P
168
56
56
56
56
8/40 F
10/40 F
39/40 P
40/40 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
2/20 color
20/20 color
20/20 color
Shape
Shape
Color
Color
56
56
56
56
56
56
20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 color
20/20 color
20/20 color
2
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 shape
3
Color
56a 40/40 P 56 40/40 P 20/20 P 20/20 color
Color
Color
Color
4
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56 40/40 P 56 40/40 P 20/20 P 20/20 shape
9 1 Shape
Shape
Color
Shape
Color
Color
Color
Color
112
56
56a
40/40 P
40/40 P
40/40 P
112
56
56
15/40 F
39/40 P
40/40 P 20/20 P 20/20 color
2
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56a 40/40 P 56 40/40 P 20/20 P 20/20 shape
3
Color
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 color
Color
Color
Color
4
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 shape
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Table 2
(Continued)
Subject Part
Block
test
(transfer
of
function)
Train
A-B
A-C
Test
Equiv
B-C
C-B
Train
D-B
E-C
Test
Equiv
D-E
E-D
Equiv–equiv
(color)
Equiv–equiv
(shape)
Discrimination
of formal
similarity
10 1 Shape
Shape
Other
Other
Shape
Color
Color
Color
168
56
56
56
40/40 P 112
56
56
56
40/40 P 20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
1/20 color
1/20 color
20/20 color
20/20 color
2
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 shape
3
Color
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 color
Color
Color
Color
4
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 shape
11 1 Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape 112
56
56
38/40 P
40/40 P
40/40 P
112
56
56
2/40 F
3/40 F
9/40 F
56
56
56a
56
40/40 P
40/40 P
56
56
56
56
40/40 P
40/40 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
20/20 P
1/20 color
1/20 color
1/20 color
20/20 color
Color
Color
Color
Color
2
Shape
Shape
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 shape
Shape
Shape
3
Color
Color
Color
Color
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 color
4
Shape
Shape
Shape
Shape
56 56 20/20 P 20/20 shape
a Start of a new training or testing session.
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with 39 of 40 correct. He was then exposed
to equivalence–equivalence testing designed
to facilitate the matching of stimuli based on
color (i.e., equivalence–equivalence color
testing), which he passed with 100% correct.
On his subsequent and initial exposure to
the Stage 3 test for the discrimination of for-
mal similarity, the subject showed a low level
(i.e., 2 of 20 responses) of matching on the
basis of color. Consequently, he was reex-
posed to (a) A-B/A-C training (56 trials), (b)
D-B/E-C training (56 trials), (c) equivalence–
equivalence color testing (100% correct),
and (d) the Stage 3 test, which now produced
matching based on color (i.e., 20 of 20 color
responding). Following a second 24-hr break,
the subject was reexposed to the four training
and testing stages listed above, and again pro-
duced 20 of 20 color matching responses. On
reexposure to the block-sorting task, however,
the subject sorted according to shape. He
was, therefore, reexposed to the four training
and testing stages listed above (which he
completed successfully). He then sorted the
blocks once again on the basis of shape, so
he was reexposed to the entire sequence of
training and testing once more. At this point,
he sorted the blocks on the basis of color. In
effect, the functions of the blocks had been
transformed relative to the baseline perfor-
mance.
In the next part of the experiment we at-
tempted to reverse the patterns of behavior
shown by the subject on the Stage 3 test and
block-sorting test. During the first part, Sub-
ject 8 had received equivalence–equivalence
tests designed to facilitate the matching of
stimuli based on color, so during this second
part he received equivalence–equivalence
tests designed to facilitate the matching of
stimuli based on shape. Consistent with the
relational frame theory model of analogy, the
subject now responded on the basis of shape
during the Stage 3 test, and immediately
showed a consistent pattern of sorting ac-
cording to shape on the block-sorting test
(see Table 2). Once again, the functions of
the blocks had been transformed, but this
time the transformation involved a reversal of
the color-based sorting functions observed
previously. The subject was then reexposed to
a sequence of training and testing designed
to facilitate the matching of stimuli based on
color, and consequently showed responding
on the basis of color during the Stage 3 test
and sorting according to color on the block-
sorting test (see Table 2). Finally, the subject
was exposed for a second time to a sequence
of training and testing designed to facilitate
the matching of stimuli based on shape, and
subsequently he showed responding on the
basis of shape during the Stage 3 test and
sorting according to shape on the block-sort-
ing test (see Table 2).
Table 2 shows that similar results were ob-
tained from the other 3 subjects in this ex-
periment, except that they completed the ex-
perimental sequence in a fewer number of
training and testing trials.
In addition, Subjects 10 and 11 passed tests
for equivalence–equivalence that involved a
third comparison. This third comparison in-
cluded two stimuli that did not participate in
the experimenter-designated equivalence re-
lations, but instead were equivalent on the ba-
sis of the same common formal property as
the elements of the sample. If Subjects 10 and
11 had been responding according to simple
equivalence relations based on formal prop-
erties, then this third comparison might have
been chosen as readily as the equivalence–
equivalence comparison. The consistent
equivalence–equivalence responding by both
subjects, however, appears to rule out an in-
terpretation based on simple similarity-based
equivalence responding.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of these experiments provide
strong empirical support for the relational
frame theory interpretation of analogy. Ex-
periment 1 provided an experimental ana-
logue of the three stages of that interpreta-
tion: (a) equivalence responding prior to the
presentation of the analogy; (b) equivalence–
equivalence responding in accord with the
analogy; and (c) the discrimination of formal
similarity via the equivalence–equivalence re-
sponding in the second stage. The main re-
sult of this experiment was that 5 subjects suc-
cessfully discriminated similarity along
certain formal dimensions via experimentally
induced equivalence–equivalence respond-
ing. Experiment 2 provided an experimental
analogue of each of the three stages of the
interpretation of analogy listed above as well
as the transformation of complex stimulus
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functions (i.e., the block-sorting task). In this
experiment, 4 novel subjects discriminated a
similarity along a particular formal dimen-
sion and then showed the predicted transfor-
mation of functions. They were then exposed
to the three stages of the experimental ana-
logue again, except that this time they dis-
criminated an alternative formal dimension
via analogy, and, once again, the appropriate
transformation of functions was observed. In
two further exposures to the experimental
analogue and subsequent block-sorting task,
subjects demonstrated two further reversals
of the transformation-of-function effect. Fur-
thermore, for 2 of the subjects in Experiment
2, an important control measure was success-
fully introduced, thus further bolstering sup-
port for the current relational frame theory
interpretation and model.
In Experiment 1, all but 1 subject, during
Stage 3 testing, immediately matched the
stimuli according to the appropriate formal
dimensions ‘‘specified’’ in the preceding
equivalence–equivalence test. In Experiment
2, however, all 4 subjects required at least two
exposures to Stage 3 before showing the pre-
dicted performance. One possible reason for
this difference is that the trained and tested
equivalence classes contained five members,
as opposed to three in Experiment 1. Anoth-
er possible reason for the difference is that
subjects in Experiment 2 received the block-
sorting task before the start of the protocol,
which may have, in some undefined way, af-
fected their stimulus matching in Stage 3.
One way to control for this latter effect in
future research might be to train and test sub-
jects using the same protocol as in Experi-
ment 2 but without the initial block-sorting
task.
A related issue is that the same subjects in
Experiment 2 who required more than one
exposure to the Stage 3 test also required
more than one exposure to the block-sorting
test before producing the predicted perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, once the predicted
block-sorting performance emerged, subjects
demonstrated multiple reversals (shifting
back and forth from color to shape, in line
with the immediately preceding training and
testing procedures). Relational frame theory
emphasizes the importance of exemplar
training in human language and cognition
(see Hayes et al., 2001). From this perspec-
tive, a subject’s first successful demonstration
of a transformation of block-sorting functions
might be viewed as a first exemplar, which
then facilitated the subsequent correct per-
formances.
One possible weakness of the current ex-
perimental analogue is that it is based on ex-
tensive training and testing. Understanding
an analogy in the context of a natural lan-
guage, for example, often occurs quickly and
with relative ease. Indeed, the utility of ana-
logical language is based upon the notion that
it allows the relatively rapid discrimination of
formal similarity between diverse events.
Thus the current protracted experimental
demonstration may appear to lack ecological
validity. Note, however, that analogy in the
natural environment requires previously es-
tablished relational networks, whereas in the
present study, new relational networks had to
be established ab initio prior to testing for
analogical responding. Thus, the majority of
the time that each subject spent in the ex-
periment was devoted to training and testing
the equivalence relations on which analogical
responding was based. One way in which to
expedite the process might be to use alter-
native experimental preparations such as the
relational evaluation procedure (see Barnes-
Holmes, Healy, & Hayes, 2000; Hayes &
Barnes, 1997), which is currently being de-
veloped in our laboratory. The key aspect of
this procedure is that it allows subjects to eval-
uate, or report on, the stimulus relations with
which they are presented. Subjects are re-
quired to confirm or deny the applicability of
particular stimulus relations to other sets of
stimulus relations. We have found that large
numbers of relational responses may be ob-
served with little or no training using this
procedure, once a number of appropriate
contextual cues have been established
(O’Hora, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
The present results support the suggestion
that the abstraction of a formal stimulus di-
mension via equivalence–equivalence re-
sponding may provide a functional analysis of
the behavioral processes involved in under-
standing analogical language. Indeed, defin-
ing analogy as equivalence–equivalence re-
sponding may promote the development of
more precise tests of analogical reasoning
than many of those reported in the cognitive
or developmental literature. Many such tests
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do not rule out nonanalogical sources of con-
trol. For example, in one study (Alexander et
al., 1989) 4- and 5-year-old children received
a series of geometrical analogy problems of
the type, ‘‘A is to B as C is to ?’’ For example,
in one problem, children were asked, ‘‘Big
red circle is to small blue circle as big red
square is to ?’’ Options that could be selected
for the missing D term were small blue
square, small red square, small red triangle,
and big yellow square. Note that the compo-
sition of the D options allowed the problem
to be solved through simple color matching
(i.e., select D option of same color as B). In
another study (Goswami & Brown, 1990), 5-
and 9-year-old children received multiple
analogy tasks such as, ‘‘Bird is to nest as dog
is to ?’’ with corresponding response options
kennel, bone, cat, or other dog. All of the 9-
year-olds and most of the 5-year-olds demon-
strated criterion performance, which was set
at 60% or more analogies correct. Although
these findings could indicate that children as
young as 5 years are competent in making
analogies, this conclusion is challenged by
the fact that the children also performed well
when the same tasks were presented without
the A and B terms (e.g., dog is to ?; kennel,
bone, cat, or other dog). In both of these ex-
amples, the tasks used were formally similar
to analogical reasoning tasks, but perfor-
mances could be accounted for by nonana-
logical matching. Perhaps future studies that
focus on analogical reasoning in children
might use the concepts and procedures em-
ployed in the present study to determine
whether young children are capable of dem-
onstrating analogical reasoning when it is de-
fined in behavioral terms. If analogical re-
sponding is found to be absent, then the
present account explicitly identifies means of
establishing particular operants that may con-
stitute the core elements of analogy.
There are additional complexities involved
in analogical reasoning that the present in-
vestigation did not address directly. Specifi-
cally, analogical reasoning in natural settings
often involves responding in accord with both
equivalence and relations other than equiva-
lence (see Hayes, 1991, for a detailed descrip-
tion of nonequivalence relations). Consider,
for example, the following problem that one
might find in a standardized test for analog-
ical reasoning: ‘‘3 is to Earth as 9 is to (a)
Neptune, (b) Pluto, (c) 12, or (d) Uranus.’’
According to relational frame theory, a solu-
tion to this problem depends on each of the
terms participating in complex relational net-
works. For example, the word Earth must par-
ticipate in a relation of equivalence with
‘‘planet that orbits the sun,’’ and in a rela-
tional frame of comparison that establishes it
as having the third orbiting position relative
to the sun in the solar system. Pluto must also
participate in frames of coordination and
comparison, except that in this case, the plan-
et is the ninth from the sun. Presuming that
these relational networks have already been
established through exposure to the wider
verbal community (e.g., science classes in
school), the juxtaposition of planets with
numbers in the analogy task may well func-
tion as a contextual cue for relating the equiv-
alence relation between 3 and Earth with the
equivalence relation between 9 and Pluto.
Thus, although various types of analogical
reasoning may require varying levels of rela-
tional complexity, the core behavioral process
from the relational frame theory perspective
remains the relating of relations.
Although the present study demonstrates a
plausible model of analogical reasoning, it
might be argued that subjects’ performances
were based to a significant extent on an al-
ready well-established history of analogical
reasoning. In other words, the investigation
simply allowed subjects to extend an already
existing repertoire of analogical reasoning to
the demonstration of relating relational
frames in the behavioral laboratory. The term
analogical reasoning, however, is not a techni-
cal term in behavior analysis, and thus it car-
ries no explanatory value. In contrast, the
concept of a relational frame has been de-
fined in functional-analytic terms. It makes
little sense, therefore, to explain subjects’
performances using nonbehaviorally defined
concepts such as analogical reasoning or oth-
er commonsense categories of human lan-
guage when a technical, behavioral nomen-
clature is available. Although the subjects
brought extensive, unknown preexperimen-
tal histories to the laboratory, the present
findings are entirely consistent with the rela-
tional frame theory argument that analogical
reasoning involves the technically defined be-
havioral process of the relating of relational
frames. Further empirical research with both
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adults and children will be needed to deter-
mine whether this is in fact the case.
In the present report, we have presented
an experimental exploration of analogy
based on equivalence–equivalence respond-
ing, one in which a listener or reader re-
sponds in accordance with a relation of equiv-
alence between two equivalence relations.
However, according to relational frame the-
ory, analogies may involve relations of equiv-
alence between other types of relations. For
example, the analogy, ‘‘an atom is like the
solar system’’ could be described as an equiv-
alence relation between two hierarchical re-
lations (in this case, satellite of, in that elec-
trons and planets are satellites of the nucleus
and the sun, respectively; see Hayes et al.,
2001). Ongoing research in our laboratories
is utilizing novel methods to analyze analog-
ical language in which nonequivalence rela-
tions participate in the underlying relational
networks.
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